Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al

L-24440, March 28, 1968

FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that--

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga." 

Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.

ISSUES:

1.  Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?
2. Should the city pay for said properties? 

HELD:

1.  If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.
2. If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State, otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." 

   

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles

L-40474, August 29, 1975

FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an abandoned road, the terminal portion of one of its streets. Later it authorized the sale through public bidding of the property. The Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. It then petitioned the RTC of Cebu for the registration of the land. The petition was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still part of the public domain, and cannot therefore be registered. 

ISSUE: May the lot be registered in the name of the buyer? 

HELD: Yes, the land can be registered in the name of the buyer, because the street in question has already been withdrawn from public use, and accordingly has become patrimonial property. The sale of the lot was therefore valid. 

Government v. Cabangis

53 Phil. 112

FACTS: In 1986, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of  Manila Bay, part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained submerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been recovered A took possession of it.


ISSUE: To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

HELD: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion, because in letting it remained submerged, A may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or the seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged; therefore, A is not entitled to the land.

Standard Oil Co. v. Jaranillo 

44 Phil. 631

FACTS: De la Rosa, who was renting a parcel of land in Manila, constructed a building of strong materials thereon, which she conveyed to plaintiff Standard Oil Co. by way of chattel mortgage. When the mortgagee was presenting the deed to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, the Registrar refused to allow the registration on the ground that the building was a real property, not personal property, and therefore could not be the subject of a valid chattel mortgage.


ISSUE: May the deed be registered in the chattel mortgage registry?

HELD: Yes, because the Registrar's duty is MINISTERIAL in character.There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of the document presented before him. He should therefore accept the legal fees being tendered, and place the document on record.

Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co.

37 Phil. 644

FACTS: The "Compania Agricola Filipina" purchased from "Strong Machinery Co." rice-cleaning machines which the former installed in one of its buildings. As security for the purchase price, the buyer executed a CHATTEL MORTGAGE on the machines and the building on which they had been installed. Upon buyer's failure to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed, and the building was purchased by the seller, the "Strong Machinery Co." This sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. Later, the "Agricola" also sold to "Strong Machinery" the lot on which the building had been constructed. This sale was not registered in the Registry of Property but the Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.

Previously however, the same building has been purchases at a sheriff's sale by Leung Yee, a creditor of Agricola, although Leung Yee knew all the time of the prior sale in favor of "Strong Machinery." The sale in favor of Leung Yee was recorded in the Registry. Leung Yee now sues to recover the property from "Strong Machinery."

ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property?

HELD:  The building is real property, therefore, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property. The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does not change its character as real property. Thus, neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building. However, since the land and the building had first been purchased by "Strong Machinery" (ahead of Leung Yee), and this fact was known to Leung Yee, it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, and should therefore not be entitled to the property. "Strong Machinery" thus has a better right to the property.