Capitol Subdivisions vs. Province of Negros Oriental

7 SCRA 60 (1963)

FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916.

Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000, payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.

These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full payment.

Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued.

It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease.

For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation.

When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.


ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.



HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been consummated.

First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the Bank’s knowledge and participation.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.

Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds: 

1.  That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property; 
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but 
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law. 

In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that “the Mandamus does not lie… because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151” dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

HELD: No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. 

Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.

A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

Gallarado v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977.

The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. 

Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners.

HELD: No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated” was violated.

The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 “Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use.”

It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.

Salas v. Jarencio

L-29788, August 30, 1972

FACTS: The City of Manila had a Torrens Title over a 7,490-square-meter lot. The municipal Board of Manila requested the President of the Philippines to have the lot declared as patrimonial property of the City so that it could be sold by the City to the actual occupants of the lot. In 1964, Congress enacted Republic Act 4118 whereby the lot was made disposable or alienable land of the State (not of the City), and its disposal was given to a national government entity, the Land Tenure Administration.


ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the National Government in giving the disposal of the lot in question to the Land Tenure Administration can be lawfully done.


HELD: Yes. There being no proof that the lot had been acquired by the City with its own funds, the presumption is that it was given to it by the State IN TRUST for the benefit of the inhabitants. Residual control remained in the State, and therefore the STATE can lawfully dispose of the lot. Thus, Republic Act 4118 is valid and constitutional and this is so even if the City of Manila will receive NO COMPENSATION from the State. 

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

131 SCRA 532 (1984)

FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration.

The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court. 

The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.

ISSUE:

1.       Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and

2.       Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. 

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. 

Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al

L-24440, March 28, 1968

FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that--

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga." 

Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playgrounds.

ISSUES:

1.  Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?
2. Should the city pay for said properties? 

HELD:

1.  If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service, the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.
2. If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without just compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should fall under the control of the State, otherwise certain governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." 

   

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles

L-40474, August 29, 1975

FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an abandoned road, the terminal portion of one of its streets. Later it authorized the sale through public bidding of the property. The Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. was able to purchase the same. It then petitioned the RTC of Cebu for the registration of the land. The petition was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still part of the public domain, and cannot therefore be registered. 

ISSUE: May the lot be registered in the name of the buyer? 

HELD: Yes, the land can be registered in the name of the buyer, because the street in question has already been withdrawn from public use, and accordingly has become patrimonial property. The sale of the lot was therefore valid. 

Government v. Cabangis

53 Phil. 112

FACTS: In 1986, A owned a parcel of land, but because of the action of the waves of  Manila Bay, part of said land was gradually submerged in the sea. It remained submerged until 1912 when the government decided to make the necessary dredging to reclaim the land from the sea. As soon as the land had been recovered A took possession of it.


ISSUE: To which does the ownership of the reclaimed land belong to?

HELD: The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense that it has become property of public dominion, because in letting it remained submerged, A may be said to have abandoned the same. Having become part of the sea or the seashore, it became property for public use. When the government took steps to make it land again, its status as public dominion remained unchanged; therefore, A is not entitled to the land.

Standard Oil Co. v. Jaranillo 

44 Phil. 631

FACTS: De la Rosa, who was renting a parcel of land in Manila, constructed a building of strong materials thereon, which she conveyed to plaintiff Standard Oil Co. by way of chattel mortgage. When the mortgagee was presenting the deed to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, the Registrar refused to allow the registration on the ground that the building was a real property, not personal property, and therefore could not be the subject of a valid chattel mortgage.


ISSUE: May the deed be registered in the chattel mortgage registry?

HELD: Yes, because the Registrar's duty is MINISTERIAL in character.There is no legal provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of the document presented before him. He should therefore accept the legal fees being tendered, and place the document on record.

Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co.

37 Phil. 644

FACTS: The "Compania Agricola Filipina" purchased from "Strong Machinery Co." rice-cleaning machines which the former installed in one of its buildings. As security for the purchase price, the buyer executed a CHATTEL MORTGAGE on the machines and the building on which they had been installed. Upon buyer's failure to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed, and the building was purchased by the seller, the "Strong Machinery Co." This sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. Later, the "Agricola" also sold to "Strong Machinery" the lot on which the building had been constructed. This sale was not registered in the Registry of Property but the Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.

Previously however, the same building has been purchases at a sheriff's sale by Leung Yee, a creditor of Agricola, although Leung Yee knew all the time of the prior sale in favor of "Strong Machinery." The sale in favor of Leung Yee was recorded in the Registry. Leung Yee now sues to recover the property from "Strong Machinery."

ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property?

HELD:  The building is real property, therefore, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property. The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does not change its character as real property. Thus, neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building. However, since the land and the building had first been purchased by "Strong Machinery" (ahead of Leung Yee), and this fact was known to Leung Yee, it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, and should therefore not be entitled to the property. "Strong Machinery" thus has a better right to the property.